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‘On very slippery ground’; 1 
The British churches, Archbishop Fisher, and the Suez crisis * 
 
 
 
This article examines the reactions of the churches to the Suez crisis, focusing in 
particular on the leadership of the Church of England. It argues that the fact of religious 
establishment required a response from the Archbishop of Canterbury who proved a 
surprisingly robust critic of the military intervention, albeit at the cost of alienating many 
in the pews. Whilst making use of his access to political elites, he nonetheless remained 
keen to work with other church leaders in developing a shared critique based on rejection 
of the use of force and Britain’s right to be judge in its own case, instead stressing the 
need for an international resolution of the crisis. Yet as the crisis developed it became 
apparent that church leaders were not always able to speak for church members, who 
were as bitterly divided as the rest of society over both the specific issue and the wider 
argument how best to respond to Britain’s declining role in the world. This in turn 
presaged future debates, as increasingly specialist church agencies and religious leaders 
found themselves taking positions on social and political affairs that were often at odds 
with those of many within their own constituencies. 
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In a joint statement issued on 20 February 2003 the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr Rowan 
Williams, and the leader of Britain’s Roman Catholics, Cardinal Cormac Murphy O’Connor, 
suggested that the moral case for a military attack on Iraq had not been made. They called for 
more time to be given for the UN weapons inspectors to finish their searches, and claimed 
that war could only be seen as a sign of failure. 
2
 This emphasis on war as evidence of human 
failure was also a key element of Archbishop Runcie’s non-triumphalist sermon which had 
outraged some Conservative politicians at the 1982 Falklands memorial service. 
3
 Of course, 
these were not the first occasions on which church leaders had spoken out in time of war, and 
recent statements had eschewed the more jingoistic excesses that characterised the 
intervention of some Anglican bishops during the 1914-1918 war. 
4
 Iraq was also not the first 
occasion on which British society was fundamentally divided over the decision for war, with 
significant sections of the elite and the public doubtful about the legitimacy of military 
action. Nearly fifty years earlier Anthony Eden had launched a controversial military action 
aimed at regime change in Egypt. As in 2003, the political temperature was raised by the 
belief of some that this action had pre-empted serious negotiation through the United Nations 
and, in the Suez case, by the eventual discovery of collusion between France, Britain and 
Israel aimed at providing an excuse for military action. In consequence, the Prime Minister 
divided British society, upset some of his own colleagues, put himself at odds with many 
Commonwealth leaders, irritated the United States, and sealed his own downfall.  
 
      In this article we explore the Suez crisis from the perspective of the British churches in 
general and the leadership of the established Church of England in particular. We argue that, 
despite ecumenical cooperation, Britain (and not just England) was still characterised by a 
hierarchical pluralism which gave its leaders a greater degree of access to policy makers, 
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even if this did not guarantee influence. The Archbishop in particular was able to engage with 
the Prime Minister, Cabinet ministers, opposition figures and editors to discover the truth of 
what was happening and also to participate directly or indirectly in discussions about the 
future of country’s political leadership. Whilst establishment gave the Archbishop greater 
degree of voice and access than others, it also exposed him to public criticism when church 
and society were divided so strongly because it was (wrongly) assumed that he spoke for the 
church as a whole. During this time he consulted widely with other church leaders, involving 
them in at least some of his discussions with political elites and encouraging joint public 
statements focused primarily on a rejection of the use of force and of Britain’s right to be 
judge in its own case, and an appeal for international solutions. Issues of morality were 
certainly raised, especially by the Archbishop and by George Bell, Bishop of Chichester, but 
there was little evidence of this critique being rooted in systematic ethical thinking 
comparable to later Anglican debates which drew more heavily on the just war tradition.  
 
      From the perspective of a more secular age, it is easily forgotten that up until the late 
1950s, the churches appeared to be in a strong position. Many churches were enjoying a 
period of growth and some hoped that successive Billy Graham crusades along with the 
home-grown activities of churches, Sunday schools, and other religious based groups, would 
keep their influence alive. Though these hopes were quickly to be dashed in the late 1950s 
and 1960s, and several studies indicated popular scepticism about organised religion, in 1956 
there still appeared some justification for optimism. 
5
 At the political level the Church of 
England remained a part of the British constitutional furniture, a key player in the 
celebrations of the new Queen’s accession and coronation which had largely excluded other 
religious communities - with the exception of a walk-on role for the Moderator of the Church 
of Scotland. Archbishop Fisher, unlike his successor, was a strong supporter of religious 
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establishment and quick to offer his not always welcome advice or opinions on a range of 
issues. 
6
 The 26 senior hierarchs could also engage with public affairs through their 
membership of the House of Lords, and on issues such as capital punishment and the partial 
decriminalisation of homosexuality were to play a role in liberalising public policy. For their 
part, the monarch and prime ministers such as Anthony Eden and Harold Macmillan took 
seriously their role in the appointment of bishops and other leading ecclesiastical figures. 
 
      Foreign affairs may have been of limited concern to worshippers in the pews, but the 
churches were involved in missionary and educational activities around the world, and were 
interested in foreign policy insofar as it might affect their interests and mission – something 
that came out very clearly during the Suez crisis. The Church of England’s Council of 
Foreign Relations, formed in 1933, had maintained good relations with the Foreign Office 
during the Second World War and into the Cold War period. There was a fair degree of 
engagement with the emerging process of decolonisation as areas of Anglican strength were 
mostly to be found in the British colonies, and the church itself was embarking upon a 
process of devolving power or creating autonomous provinces free of Canterbury’s control. 
During this period the personal connections of archbishops and senior Anglican bishops with 
leading politicians and other society figures ensured that they were often extremely well-
informed on what was going on behind the scenes. Other churches had similar concerns, if 
not always the close contacts with imperial power, and the ecumenical British Council of 
Churches (BCC) had its own International Department which providing background 
information for church leaders and activists involved with foreign affairs broadly conceived. 
Whilst the Catholic hierarchy in England was remarkably quiet, largely because of the 
interregnum following the death of Cardinal Griffin, most of the other major churches 
engaged with the issue even if many were too divided to adopt a formal position.  
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A developing crisis, July-October 1956 
 
From a contemporary perspective it is sometimes hard to realise the significance of the Suez 
crisis,
 7
 which ‘cruelly punctured most of the country’s remaining pretensions to being a 
power of the first rank’, 8 ‘tore apart the Anglo-American relationship and damaged the unity 
of the Commonwealth’. 9 It divided society and shook up the whole political system, though 
the rise in the political temperature of the political class was a relatively short-lived 
phenomenon. 
10
 The origins of the crisis lay in the Egyptian nationalist coup of 1952, led by 
Muhammed Naguib. Behind the scenes, however, the dominant figure was Gamal Abdel 
Nasser who seized power at the end of 1954 and was chosen as president in a referendum in 
June 1956. Two years earlier the new regime had reached an agreement with the British 
government that the latter would withdraw its troops from the Suez Canal zone over a twenty 
month period. Matters were complicated by concurrent negotiations over the funding of the 
Aswan Dam. On 19 July 1956, seven days after the US decision to withdraw funding support 
for the latter project, Nasser announced that he was nationalising the Anglo-French Suez 
Canal Company. Eden was incensed, seeing this as both a violation of the 1954 agreement 
and as evidence of Nasser’s duplicity. Increasingly he compared the Egyptian leader to Adolf 
Hitler and viewed the whole crisis through the prism of the appeasement struggle of the 
1930s. Whilst some saw Nasser as more akin to Mussolini, many feared that Eden was letting 
this obsession cloud his judgement and making him focus obsessively on how to remove 
Nasser rather than on how to resolve the conflict in a way that was advantageous for Britain. 
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        Though Nasser was fully within his right to nationalise the canal company, many in 
public life thought that he had acted badly, and that if not stopped he would stage further 
provocations. Most saw negotiation through the agency of the United Nations as the preferred 
method for dealing with the issues, even if the Security Council veto system meant that 
getting any unified response was unlikely. Christian leaders did not immediately enter the 
fray, but church newspapers and their letters’ pages reflected different points of view. On 3 
August the Church Times in its unsigned summary of the news commented that Nasser's 
seizure of the canal was hardly surprising given Britain's withdrawal from the canal zone, 
something that was: 
 
…an open declaration to the world of British weakness. It invited, and has now 
received, the reward which is always accorded to weakness in world politics....Will 
Britain use force to keep Suez open? If the answer is "Yes", only Colonel Nasser need 
suffer. If the answer is "No"' then the Russians will know that they need pay no further 
attention to any declaration by Britain of resolve to protect her national interests. 
11
 
 
On the same day an anonymous viewpoint offered in The Church of England Newspaper 
made the ill-fated comparison of Nasser to the Nazis – several weeks later an editorial in The 
Baptist Times was to make the same comparison suggesting that Nasser’s recently published 
book on the philosophy of his revolution was ‘another Mein Kampf’. 12 Yet all of these papers 
quickly reverted to the position that hasty action should be avoided, because legally, if not 
morally, Nasser was acting within his rights and the key issue was whether he would allow 
free passage through the canal. 
13
 The Roman Catholic magazine The Tablet, at the beginning 
of September, expressed the hope that ‘no more is going to be said about the use of force, 
which is not the proper or appropriate remedy in this case’, and two weeks later it warned 
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against facile comparisons to appeasement. 
14
 For The Catholic Herald talk of force might be 
useful in indicating British resolve, but ‘it remains equally true that actual armed intervention 
would be universally disastrous’ and probably end in short term success following by a 
lengthy occupation in the face of a resentful and hostile Egyptian population. 
15
 Inevitably the 
ebb and flow of developments as well as the different perspectives of the contributors 
rendered it difficult for church newspapers to develop a consistent position, but on 7 
September The Church of England Newspaper praised the ‘masterly statesmanship’ of 
Anthony Eden in organizing a conference to which Nasser was invited, and attacked critics of 
the Government as ‘a pack of unpatriotic escapists’. 16 
 
       The Archbishop of Canterbury Geoffrey Fisher initially offered no public response, 
though before the nationalisation he had been receiving intelligence from Anglicans in the 
Middle East suggesting growing hostility to Britain. According to the Bishop of Egypt this 
stemmed from the creation of Israel and the feeling of many Arabs that they were being 
patronised as a backward people incapable of managing themselves. 
17
 On 12 September the 
Lord Chancellor, Lord Kilmuir, had introduced a motion in the House of Lords condemning 
Nasser’s actions and supporting the government’s pursuit of a peaceful settlement. The 
following day an opposition amendment was proposed by Lord Attlee which shared the 
condemnation but deplored the government’s refusal to invoke UN authority. He called ‘upon 
Her Majesty's Government to refer the dispute immediately to the United Nations and to 
declare that they will not use force except in conformity with our obligation under the Charter 
of the United Nations; and to refrain meanwhile from any form of provocative action’.  
 
       The first episcopal intervention came from Bishop Bell of Chichester, a frequent 
contributor to debates in the House of Lords. During the war he had upset several 
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Conservative leaders by his condemnation of the blanket bombing of German cities and, after 
the war, by his critique of nuclear weapons. Bell raised questions about the necessity of force 
and asked under whose authority it might come to be used. For Bell this would require UN 
backing, and he was concerned about a government resolution that referred to ‘other means’ 
possibly independent of the United Nations. He concluded by agreeing with Lord Attlee that 
‘the moral leadership of Britain’ was its greatest asset, and to act independently would risk 
forfeiting the country’s position in a rapidly changing world. In his contribution Archbishop 
Fisher started by agreeing that Nasser had been guilty of an act of aggression ‘destructive of 
all the restraints of international law’, but he was concerned that military precautions and 
planning sent out certain messages.   
 
A more serious criticism than that made on military precautions is the criticism that the 
Government will not rule out the use of physical force in the last resort. And may I, 
following the example of the noble Lord, Lord Beveridge, substitute for "physical 
force" the word "war"—because it means war, and nothing else. I have noticed in the 
papers a lot of talk about what should be done in the last resort. Every kind of 
periphrasis is used except the word "war". But let us face the fact that any use against 
Egypt of physical force is war. 
 
Of even greater concern was that this issue had the potential to divide the nation, for: 
 
A divided nation, on a fundamental point like this, is necessarily weak and ineffective. 
In particular, I believe, it is quite unthinkable that in any circumstances the Government 
should go to war against Egypt without the general support of the whole of Parliament 
or, in an emergency, of the leaders of all Parties…  
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He accepted that the United Nations was ‘still a very insecure instrument for the upholding of 
international law’ but if we were to accept its role as umpire we had to accept that even if it 
made a decision against our interests. At the end of the debate, followed up later in a private 
letter to Lord Attlee, Fisher said that he could not vote for the opposition amendment because 
it was ungenerous in questioning the government’s good intentions. 18  
 
      This faith was to come under increasing pressure in the coming months as was Fisher’s 
hope that the country would remain united. The day after this speech R.Y.Jennings, Professor 
of International Law at Oxford University, wrote to Fisher pointing out that Nasser’s seizure 
of the canal was not in breach of international law and therefore, regardless of what the UN 
might decide, there was no legitimate reason for war. In his usually ebullient way, Fisher 
wrote back accepting the criticism but stressing that the case against Nasser was a moral one 
because he had been guilty of an aggressive act, but the Archbishop’s tone was slightly less 
confident. 
19
 He was also by this stage getting letters criticising him for questioning the 
government’s good faith and asking him not to enter the political arena claiming to represent 
all Christians. 
20
 These interventions also led to the first of a series of Suez exchanges with 
Lord Hailsham, who called Fisher‘s equation of the use of force with war a ‘lamentable 
heresy’. Fisher responded that there might be a legal difference but to the ordinary man they 
were the same thing. 
21
 As chairman of the British Council of Churches Fisher sent a letter to 
Eden in mid-September expressing their view that the matter had to be resolved within the 
UN framework, and received the laconic reply that the prime minister was ‘interested to hear 
their opinion’. 22 Access was certainly no guarantee of influence or even of being heard. 
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Reactions to military intervention 
 
On 29 October Israel launched its attack on Egypt and on 31 October British aircraft bombed 
Egyptian airfields, with paratroopers landing in the canal zone five days later. The official 
rationale was to keep the warring parties apart and to ensure safe passage through the canal. 
What was not made public at the time was an earlier agreement between the French, British 
and Israelis to stage events in this way. With a House of Lords debate due the following day, 
Bishop Bell wrote to Fisher on 31 October expressing his concerns, noting that ‘even the 
Daily Mail points out’ that not only is the Government’s action ‘outside the Charter, but that 
it appears to lack any treaty basis, or legal basis. It also puts us at odds with the United States 
and with members of the Commonwealth’. 23 Unusually perhaps, given their different images 
as establishment figure and serial dissenter on foreign policy issues, Fisher and Bell were at 
one on the Suez crisis.  
 
      On 1 November Fisher spoke in the House of Lords debate on a critical opposition 
amendment where Lord Henderson charged that the British and French governments’ go-it-
alone’ actions had produced disunity at home, at the Security Council, in the Commonwealth 
and in relations with the USA. At this point Fisher intervened to ask whether we: 
 
…are doing the right thing by the highest and wisest standards that we, as a nation, 
know?...The simplest, the most obvious thing is that Israel should withdraw within its own 
borders. Then the temporary situation is saved and the Canal is no longer tinder 
threat…Objectively regarded, Egypt is at present within its own borders. Israel is out of 
bounds, and the British and French Governments are out of bounds also. The immediate 
task is to bring everyone back within his own rightful place. 
24
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At this point the Lord Chancellor, Lord Kilmuir, got up to explain the government’s action as 
a form of self-defence under the UN Charter, at which point occurred the well-known clash 
with Fisher.  
 
THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTER-BURY 
My Lords, the noble and learned Viscount referred to the attacking Power against which 
we have to exercise self-defence. Who is the attacking Power?  
THE LORD CHANCELLOR 
My Lords, I said that self-defence extended to the protection of nationals on someone 
else's territory. In that case, we have the right to intervene and use force in that territory 
to protect our nationals. Then the second point arises—I hope I made this clear; I 
intended to put it entirely fairly—first, we make a peaceful landing; then, if the Power 
into whose territory we are going says that they will resist with all their force, the force 
which we have the right to use is automatically extended to that sufficient to repulse the 
force threatened.  
THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY 
Which is the attacking Power in this case?  
 
Fisher continued to press the Lord Chancellor who eventually commented that it was Egypt 
‘who has refused to stop’. 
 
THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTER-BURY 
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This is terribly important, and perhaps I might ask the Lord Chancellor this. Where does 
the operational force originate? I should have thought that the attacking force, whether 
you like it or not, was Israel. Is that not so? 
When Kilmuir agreed he continued: 
 
May I say this? I entirely accept everything that the Lord Chancellor has said. I was not 
criticising it nor attacking it. I was merely asking a question: where did the force 
originate? That, he says, is Israel; and that is all I wanted to establish. 
25
 
 
Having significantly embarrassed the Lord Chancellor, the Archbishop followed this up with 
a letter to Anthony Eden the following day. Though written in his role as chairman of the 
British Council of Churches, he prefaced it with a personal note saying that: 
 
 I doubt whether you and the Government realize the depth of something approaching 
despair felt right through the country at the present situation…it goes right through very 
ordinary Christian folk and beyond their bounds, and certainly very many life-long 
Conservatives are bewildered; speaking in the Lords I exercised maximum restraint and 
did not accuse the government of breaking our obligations to the UN. I simply said that 
we were on insecure ground and on very slippery ground. I am sure that Christians in 
general, and a vast number of citizens would say not only that we were on slippery 
ground but that we have slipt. 
26
 
 
These various exchanges made clear that however conservative Fisher was by nature, his 
inclination to give the government the benefit of the doubt was wearing thin. 
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     This stance was supported by other church leaders, though not all. On 3 November a 
group from the British Council of Churches led by Fisher had met with the Lord Chancellor 
to express their concerns and call for an immediate ceasefire. 
27
 The Council itself was in 
receipt of a number of critical letters from member churches critical of the government 
position though their own adherents were often divided. Nonetheless on 8 November the 
BCC issued a press statement which expressed its ‘grave disquiet’ that the Government 
should have taken unilateral action. Perhaps the most outspoken statement came in a press 
release on 4 November from the Church Missionary Society which circulated a memo by Rev 
C.S.Milford, West Asia and Egypt Secretary of the Society. He noted the position of 
missionaries in the region, and the fact that some have had to leave Jordan because of 
disturbances, and says that: 
 
If the Government appears to be trying to re-establish Western control by force, the effect 
on the witness of our Society may well be disastrous. We therefore most heartily endorse, 
from our special angle, the words of the Archbishop of Canterbury during the recent 
House of Lords debate: “Here surely we are wise to see what other people think of 
us”…We believe that the universal desire among formerly subject peoples for self-
determination is a healthy movement of the human spirit. This means that our own country 
among others must accept a diminished position in the international scene. 
28
  
 
Missionaries and church activists working in the Middle East were increasingly uneasy about 
the situation, as growing pressure forced some to leave. Winifred Coates, a missionary 
working in Jordan but now forced out, wrote to The Church of England Newspaper that ‘we 
believed that the old imperial policy of making peace by making war had long been 
forsaken’. 29 Similar sentiments were apparent in letters sent to Bishop Bell and others by 
14 
 
missionaries in the field. The BCC called on the government to remit the dispute to the 
United Nations whilst some of its members stressed the need to link resolution of this conflict 
to a just settlement of the wider Arab-Israeli conflict – a call that was to be heard repeatedly 
in subsequent decades. 
30
 By the end of the month some of these fears about the implications 
of British actions were realised with the expulsion of the Anglican bishop in Egypt, along 
with some of his staff and several doctors associated with mission organisations. 
31
 
 
      Whilst church leaders may have given the impressions of considerable unity in their 
critique of government actions, the reality was more complex. The Church Times offered 
qualified support on 2 November, 
32
 and one week later The Church of England Newspaper 
carried a commentary with the headline ‘Eden was right’. Here it suggested that the prime 
minister had ‘burst the bubble of moral inanity that hung over the United Nations and 
frustrated clear thinking about international affairs’, and it condemned the BCC’s hasty 
response, saying that ‘an attack on Israel’s interests in the canal zone was an attack on the 
world’s interests’. 33 In the weeks that followed both papers carried a series of letters on 
either side of the debate, focusing on issues of morality, the need to defend Israel, keep 
communism at bay, or defend British interests. 
34
 On 23 November the Rev J.Aidan Harlow 
commented disapprovingly on the fact that ‘we have the Archbishop of Canterbury attacking 
the prime minister for what will surely go down in history as an outstanding act of moral 
courage, foresight and true concern for humanity. I only wish the archbishop had not taken it 
upon himself to speak for us all.’ He went on to praise Robert Mortimer, the Bishop of 
Exeter, who ‘has spoken out of true Christian conscience, not counting the cost and 
disregarding the ecclesiastical party line, which in these challenging days savours too much 
of spineless churchianity.’35 Fisher’s comments, and particularly his intervention in the 
House of Lords, came in for plenty of criticism. A letter from Kenneth de Courcy 
36
 argued 
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that it was an extraordinary thing for the Archbishop to claim that Christian opinion was 
shocked by the government’s actions, and suggested that Fisher should ‘admit this, Christian 
opinion is divided. I for one think the Government’s action is right and brave. I pray for the 
full and decisive victory of our forces’. 37  
 
      Once again there was an extensive exchange with Lord Hailsham, always ready to cross 
swords on politics or theology with the Archbishop. Writing on 6 November he warned 
Fisher that when he addressed the Lords: 
 
I shall almost inevitably make some unflattering references to your own public part in this 
matter. I must tell you frankly that although I recognize your good intentions and sincerity 
in the cause of peace, I consider both your speech in the House of Lords and your 
subsequent actions to have been calamitously ill-judged and I shall say so. I do wish you 
would realize how much confidence in your leadership has been shaken amongst some 
ordinary occupants of the pew.  
 
Three days later, Hailsham noted that whilst the situation has changed, my underlying 
critique remains, because ‘I believe that an Archbishop has an immense influence with 
Governments and the public, but not if he always speaks publicly and never privately, and 
exhausts all his ammunition before the facts are ascertained adequately or the moment for his 
intervention has come’. He went on to criticize his frequent interruptions of the Lord 
Chancellor with a question that was ‘irrelevant to the point and…was confusing the Minister 
and making it difficult for him to make his point?’ Fisher responded five days later noting 
that he was making two basic points: that the nation was divided over this issue, with many 
Christians unhappy about the action, and that the only attacking nation was Israel, because 
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Egypt had not launched any attack or made any hostile move against us.  Hailsham retorted 
that nothing would convince him that between Israel and Egypt, Egypt was the not the 
aggressor and that Israel was not acting in legitimate self-defense, and ‘I regard the outbreak 
of hostilities whoever was the aggressor as the emergence of a state of anarchy which 
demanded an intervention to protect our vital interest’. At this point Fisher drew the 
correspondence to a close for the time being, commenting in a brief note to himself, or 
posterity, that Hailsham always wants the last word, and questioning the latter’s 
‘psychological balance…and powers of wise judgment’. 38 
 
      Yet Hailsham was right that people in the pews were divided over the issue, particularly 
at this stage when information about the origins of the action was not freely available. Whilst 
Cuthbert Bardsley, Bishop of Coventry might suggest that any premature resort to force was 
an abrogation of moral leadership, 
39
 or Bishop Bell write to The Times stressing that the 
moral issue should be paramount in assessing the Government’s actions and that no 
government could be judge in its own cause, 
40
 other bishops took a different line. Mortimer 
of Exeter suggested that Eden had shown ‘superb moral courage’ as a peacemaker acting to 
prevent a major war, and ‘led the country into an action which is morally courageous and 
right…If the Prime Minister has struck a blow at the United Nations, I believe that it is the 
blow of the surgeon’s knife and not the assassin’s cudgel’. 41 Frank Wood, Bishop of 
Middleton, wrote to BCC General Secretary Kenneth Slack that ‘I would find myself unable 
to put my name to anything like an outright condemnation of the British Government…I have 
come to the conclusion that Nasser intended…to try and wipe Israel off the map…On the 
other hand, I hope very much that the Council will urge the Government to be ready to accept 
a police force which does not include either British or French troops’. 42 The free churches 
were equally divided and the letters’ pages of The Methodist Recorder and The Baptist Times 
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are full of heated exchanges on both sides, 
43
 with one contributor to the former suggesting 
that  it was ‘a source of deep shame that Britain should lose its good name while a Methodist 
is Foreign Secretary’. 44 Several of the Protestant churches were too divided to offer their 
flock clear guidance, with the Council of the Baptist Union unable to express ‘any common 
mind’. The Church of Scotland preferred to look forward rather than apportion blame, much 
to the chagrin of one leading member who wrote to Bishop Bell apologising for his church’s 
‘most humiliating abdication of responsibility’. 45  
 
 
The collusion question 
 
Of course, most of these interventions came from men who knew nothing of the back-story to 
Suez that gradually leaked out over the following weeks. None of this discussion took 
account of the fact that French, British and Israeli representatives had met in Sèvres on 22-24 
October to concoct the chain of events that they hoped would lead to the overthrow of 
Nasser. As November progressed this issue was raised more frequently and, perhaps by 
chance, as early as 3 November The Tablet commented that even if there had been no 
collusion, this was how it will appear to many in the Arab world. The emerging discussion of 
collusion ran parallel with concerns about Eden’s fitness for the job, with the same editorial 
commenting that ‘the man who is wielding all the power is forever remembering the 1930s, 
and itching to do something strong for its own sake’. 46 This was a view taken by some of 
Eden’s own colleagues who, once things began to go wrong, sought to distance themselves 
from the decision to intervene. Following Eden’s ill-advised decision to recuperate in 
Jamaica during late November and early December, it was increasingly clear that his days as 
Prime Minister were numbered.  
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      Though Britain ceased its military action on the 6 November, the political temperature 
continued to rise in the following weeks, and the political households of the capital played 
host to numerous meetings where Suez was hotly debated. The Lambeth archives include 
some intriguing documents suggesting that the Archbishop Fisher was well aware of at least 
some of these discussions, though he also kept a distance from them. 
47
 In his files there is a 
note from Rev Herbert Waddams, Secretary of the Church of England’s Council on Foreign 
Relations, dated 6 November, and reporting a phone conversation with Michael Scott earlier 
that day. Scott was a controversial cleric who worked extensively in South Africa and had 
often been a thorn in Fisher’s side because he refused to accept the primarily diplomatic 
approach to apartheid favoured by the then Archbishop of Capetown. Waddams note 
continues: 
 
Michael Scott rang me up this morning to say that he and some others thought it highly 
desirable that some national council should be formed to keep opposition to 
Government policy out of purely party politics, and to provide a focus for the 
uneasiness of many people in the country….I said I would have a word with the 
Archbishop who did not take any definite line at such an early stage; a few minutes later 
Chichester rang and he thought any action should be concerted  with Judd 
48
 at the UN 
and wondered if Lord Halifax could be induced to take part; I then discussed it with 
Stephen King Hall who said that if a committee were formed to take action outside 
constitutional processes it would have to be very strong and that if it were not, it would 
be likely to dissipate pressure on the Government rather than to concentrate it…he 
thought that ordinary constitutional methods had not yet been exhausted. 
49
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Remarkable here is the suggestion that some people were at least considering the option of 
non-constitutional means of resolving the political crisis and that Fisher was at least aware of 
such conversations, even if, like most responsible public figures, he carefully avoided such 
talk. 
 
      The Fisher papers contain another note by Waddams reporting a meeting held at the home 
of David Astor, editor of the Observer whose editorial pages on 4 November had already 
stated that ‘we had not realised that our Government was capable of such folly and such 
crookedness.’ 50 This undated note refers to the presence of Violet Bonham Carter, Michael 
Scott, Ian Gilmour of The Spectator, Lord Altrincham, and the Labour politician Kenneth 
Younger. They discussed the issue of what Astor calls the ‘scandalous collusion’ between the 
three governments, and the fact that the resultant moral stain might harm the Conservatives at 
the next election. It was also noted that the only person who seemed to know the full truth 
was William Haley, editor of The Times, who felt obliged to honour information given in 
confidence but who has consequently turned against the Government. 
51
 Clearly there was a 
lot of conversation and debate going on, and well-connected clerics such as Fisher and Bell 
seem to have been aware of collusion from a very early stage, possible in the former’s case 
via conversations with William Clark, Eden’s disillusioned, gossipy and anti-Suez press 
secretary who had previously worked for The Observer. 
52
 
 
     On 20 November, the day that The Guardian reported French pilots playing a role in the 
Israeli attacks, Bishop Bell put this charge firmly in the public domain. In a letter to The 
Times he asked the Prime Minister whether there was any truth to the rumour that three 
governments had met in France and agreed a plan already prepared by the French and the 
Israelis. 
53
 In response he was attacked two days later by Bernard Braine MP,  who said that 
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this was an outrageous line of questioning which ignored the Foreign Secretary’s statement 
that there was no prior collusion though Israel had given advance warning of mobilisation. 
54
 
Bell was also criticised in a private letter from a lay person in the Chichester diocese who 
said that Anthony Eden had ‘done more for peace and goodwill during 10 years than any man 
alive… more than the Church has done’. 55 Despite this, the church press continued to publish 
a variety of opinions, though many editors were increasingly sceptical about the 
government’s attempt to set itself up as judge in its own cause. The Church of Scotland’s Life 
and Work asked whether it was: 
 
…better to violate the Charter and act as you believe necessary, or abide by the Charter 
and perhaps see a situation worsen which you believe you could have saved? This is a 
hard dilemma; but the peace of the world, the long range peace, may well depend on the 
willingness of nations to wait when it may seem agonisingly wrong to delay. 
56
  
 
In The Baptist Times at the end of November, an anonymous columnist suggested that 
charges of prior knowledge or even collusion had not been answered properly and that the 
replies given by Mr Butler in the House of Commons ‘read like lamentable evasions’. 57 
 
      Archbishop Fisher generally made no public statements suggesting collusion, but was 
blunt in private correspondence. In a letter sent to Rev H.K.Sherill, presiding bishop of the 
American Episcopal Church, on 6 December he stated: 
 
It is known to some of us here beyond all doubt that the Prime Minister knew of the 
Israel invasion before it took place: he knew it was going to happen: he knew that we 
were going to use the opportunity to send our own ultimatum and he deliberately did 
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not tell the American ambassador; nothing could be more insulting than that, and I think 
that the Government got all that they deserved. 
58
 
 
A handwritten note in the Archbishop’s papers reflects further on the question and notes R.A. 
Butler’s comment to him at a Buckingham Palace garden party that the last few weeks had 
been dreadful. In consequence they fixed a private meeting at Butler’s house for 13 
December and here Fisher made the point that Eden clearly knew of Israeli intentions and had 
deliberately kept the USA in the dark as well as most of the Commonwealth. For his part 
Butler tried to distinguish between the prime minister’s errors of judgement and anything 
immoral, and suggested he was doing what he thought best for the country.  Fisher responded 
that he was unable to accept this distinction, and: 
 
I said the trouble was in the PM. However devoted to the public good, he had lost his 
balance of judgment…Rab said nothing in anyway disloyal to PM…But he took my 
account in silence, and more than once said “I did not know everything, the matter was 
kept very tight”. If the PM’s second-in-command can say that, things were indeed in 
jeopardy… So we ended. He had tried to lead me off the point and I had not followed. 59  
 
Eight days later Herbert Waddams sat in the public gallery when Anthony Eden got up in the 
Commons to deny foreknowledge of the Israeli attack, and he notes Lady Violet Bonham 
Carter’s comment that they need to talk with the editor of The Times William Haley about 
what to do next. 
60
 Eden’s resignation in the New Year effectively ended such discussions.  
 
 
*      *      *      *      * 
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A number of conclusions emerge from this study concerning the public engagement of the 
churches in a religious context characterised by hierarchical pluralism, the types of arguments 
advanced by church leaders in critiquing military intervention in Egypt, and the divisions 
within church and society relating to both Suez and the wider role of Britain and the world.  
Increasingly the churches sought to work together on key moral and political issues, but the 
Church of England remained primus inter pares, its leaders expected to speak on issues of the 
day but, in those days, not expected to rock the boat. Personally Archbishop Fisher was a 
conservative establishment man who was reluctant to go too far in public, though also 
unpredictable in his interventions in the political sphere. Despite the sharp exchange with the 
Lord Chancellor in the Lords and speeches questioning the wisdom of Eden’s policies, his 
most barbed comments were confined to private meetings, letters and memorandum. Indeed, 
much of the most critical activity took place behind the scenes in a world where leading 
Anglican hierarchs and government ministers still met in the lobbies and offices at 
Westminster, at Buckingham Palace garden parties, in gentleman’s clubs or at gatherings in 
private houses. In this atmosphere Archbishop Fisher could raise sharper questions about the 
integrity and even the mental balance of the prime minister and contribute to discussions of 
Eden’s political future. This was a world that was not to last much beyond the 1950s as the 
old Edwardian-formed political establishment faded away, and a new archbishop more 
sceptical about the virtues of religious establishment took office in 1961.  
 
      Suez also marked the beginning of a period where Anglican and other church leaders 
were more frequently to be found at odds with the government of the day or on some issues, 
such as capital punishment or the partial decriminalisation of homosexuality, at odds with a 
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more conservative public opinion. 
61
  In the past individual clergymen like Canon Collins at 
St Paul’s Cathedral or bishops such as Bishop Bell had acted as gadflies on issues such as the 
blanket bombing of German cities or on the nuclear issue following the war, but future 
decades were to be notable for more visible tensions over a range of domestic and foreign 
policies. On the Suez issue the critique was fairly undeveloped and scattershot in approach. It 
focused primarily on the need to refer conflicts to an admittedly feeble United Nations, to 
observe international law – though there was little grasp of what exactly this might entail – 
and a rejection of the idea of that interests could somehow trump morality.  Addressing the 
House of Lords on 1 November, Fisher argued that talk of ‘our vital interests’ or ‘the vital 
interests of Israel’ is ‘beside the point’. The real issue is that when we joined the United 
Nations we ‘bound ourselves in honour not to claim to be judges in our own cause’. 62 Much 
of this argument was pragmatic in nature, dwelling less on ethics and theology than on 
pragmatic concerns about the domestic and international political arena, and is part of a 
general turn to a ‘public reason’ approach as church leaders made their case in what they 
recognised as an increasingly secular society. Bell and Fisher certainly felt a moral revulsion 
at what they saw as the dishonesty underlying government policy during the Suez crisis, but 
they often preferred in public to focus on the practical consequences for the country in the 
international arena. There was also awareness that Britain had lost the moral high ground 
when asked to condemn the Soviet invasion of Hungary at the same time, and recognition 
that Britain would henceforth enjoy a reduced role in the world. What was mostly absent, as 
pointed out by a letter writer in The Catholic Herald, 
63
 was any attempt to evaluate the 
intervention with reference to the just war theory. That may have been because this was ‘too 
Catholic’ a conceptual framework - though implicit in some of Bishop Bell of Chichester’s 
critique of obliteration bombing during the war and speeches on nuclear weapons – and was 
only to be taken up by Anglican thinkers later in the century. 
64
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      In the pews opinion was as divided as in the rest of society, with Kenneth Younger 
suggesting that in fact the mass of ordinary people following the launch of the attack inclined 
to ‘a nationalist not to say chauvinistic reaction’. 65 Public opinion ran broadly in favour of 
the Government for much of the period, with various intellectuals noting in diaries and letters 
that their own positions were out of tune with majority opinion. Equally divided were the 
newspapers, with The Observer experiencing a loss of advertising revenue as a consequence 
of its outspoken editorial position. 
66
 This article has suggested that the churches and their 
members were no different from the rest of society, with some influential laypeople horrified 
that the Archbishop of Canterbury did not play his appointed established role as government 
supporter. Leading Christian parliamentarians such as Lord Hailsham and the Baptist MP 
Cyril Black offered strong support to the Prime Minister and criticised Archbishop Fisher, 
who found himself in the not entirely comfortable position of leading a church attack on the 
government of the day when British troops were in action. 
67
 Of course, the role of the 
churches was always marginal to the core conflict but, as Lord Hailsham rightly pointed out, 
many in the Anglican pews were confused by the stance taken by Archbishop Fisher and 
others, unused to seeing church leaders seemingly at odds with the government on a major 
policy issue. In practice the divisions caused by Suez, if not its political consequences, 
proved short-lived, but within the churches it presaged a period when their leaders 
increasingly often found themselves out of steps with those in the pews on public affairs. 
      
      The Suez crisis contributed to a growing recognition and acceptance of Britain’s reduced 
role in the world. At the beginning of the crisis politicians and some religious commentators 
were framing it in terms of defending Britain’s vital interests – which presumably trumped 
the interests of others - with The Baptist Times arguing that the Suez canal could not be 
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treated as ‘simply an Egyptian affair’ because ‘the whole economy of the West, as well as the 
defence of Asia, depends upon that line of communication’ 68 By way of contrast, The 
Catholic Herald commented that the world has changed and a change of attitude on the 
West’s part was required if we were to avoid further provocations in the future. 69 This was 
also realised by that idiosyncratic churchman Enoch Powell who claimed that Suez ‘cut deep 
into the consciousness of the British people...They no longer felt sure of themselves. They 
disbelieved that they could any longer be a nation, with all that meant in terms of 
independence, pride, and self-confidence’ 70 Such a view might resonate with someone like 
Powell with his almost mystical understanding of the nation, but in reality the last word is 
perhaps best left to John Robinson, then Dean of Clare College Cambridge and yet to achieve 
notoriety of his own: 
 
Rarely, one has got the impression, have the mass of people in this country had their 
heads so complacently in the sand. It was shock enough to realise that, after the first 
dazed uneasiness, most people had not really been shaken to any degree by the Suez 
intervention. One imagined a wave of revulsion such as swept over the country after the 
Hoare-Laval deal. But with a week most people were preparing to justify it by 
results…I find myself dismayed and shattered by political events to a degree that I 
seldom if ever remember before, I feel it has destroyed the only basis upon which 
Britain could hope to exercise leadership in the post-war situation and that it has finally 
finished us as a great power more effectively than Hitler ever did. 
71
 
 
 
* I am grateful for the help of a number of people who helped this first entry into British history, 
including Edward Burrows, Mark Imber, Tony Lang, Andy Williams, Tim Wilson, the two 
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anonymous referees, and the incredibly helpful archivists at Lambeth Palace Library and the Church 
of England Record Office.  
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